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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT

Valley
opening brief.

has skirted many

of the arguments

in Sine's

Its philosophy appears to be one of ignoring the

lower court's errors, since it feels entitled to win and did.

To

argue that "all's well that ends well" does not work in this
case.

Valley cannot, under law or equity, agree to bid the full

debt, extract a promise that Sine would not attend the sale,
arbitrarily bid in a lower amount and then be awarded judgment
for the $340,000 difference.
Valley had the right to pursue Sine directly.

But by

electing to dispose of the collateral by sheriff sale, Valley
subjected

itself

to the statutory

requirements for seeking a

deficiency.

ARGUMENT

1.

A trial is needed to determine the facts.

listing of facts is revealing.
through

18

decry

a

need

for

Br. pp. 6-7.
evidence

on

Valley's

Paragraphs 15
various

issues.

Paragraph 19 sets forth the following facts relating to the Se
Rancho Motel which are admittedly "not in the record":
a.

that redemptive rights were granted to Sines,

b.

that those rights were not exercised,
- 1 -

c.

that Valley has attempted to sell the motel,

d.

that those sales efforts have not succeeded,

e.

that Valley is leasing the motel to Sines.

Valley must feel these are material to the appeal or they would
not have been set forth in its brief.

If there are facts not in

the record which the moving party feels are material, one must
question whether

that party should have been awarded summary

judgment.
Paragraph 20 of the response brief begrudgingly concedes
that Valley has admitted that it "agreed to do certain things."
Br. p. 7.

Of course those "things" are to bid in the amount of

the debt, costs and attorney fees.

Without skipping a beat,

Valley then "disagrees with the statements" in the affidavits of
Sine and Cundick.
without

Appendix IV to opening brief.

specifics, accuses

affidavits.
that it

Valley then,

Sine of mischaracterizing

its own

Even though Valley says for purposes of the appeal

"agreed" to stay away from the sale, Br. p. 7.,

Sine is

punished repeatedly by Valley for precisely the same terminology.
Br. pp. 7, 8, 15, 17, 18 and 23.
Clearly the record lacks necessary richness.
necessary

to determine the various

issues.

Trial is

This problem is

underlined by the fact Valley failed to respond to Sine's point #
4, "Trial is needed to determine the nature of the new oral
agreement."

So

in addition

to legal error, factual

prevent summary judgment.
- 2 -

issues

Valley

has

rightly

invited

the

Court

to

"determine

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Br. p.

10.

2.

Valley essentially admits lower court error.

For

example, it states, "Though the language of the Summary Decision
is somewhat ambiguous, the district court did not make a specific
finding
Posing

that

Valley's

this problem

fact-finding.

statement

constituted

an

agreement."

points again to the need for trial and

Valley calls the Summary Decision "ambiguous", and

feels the need to torture its wording to support its victory.
The decision is Appendix II of Sine's opening brief and Addendum
A

to Valley's

response.

Valley

drafted

no further

written

decision for the court to consider—only a judgment.
Then comes the following charge: "Valley argues that to
the extent the district court implied the existence of an oral
agreement

as

the

basis

unfounded

and erroneous."

for

its

ruling, such

Br. p. 11.

error, reversal is warranted.

implication

is

If both parties find

And a trial is needed if

Valley

itself is unsure whether the lower court based its decision on
existence of an agreement.

Finally, Valley

appeal and raise its point of error.

- 3 -

failed to cross

3.

A deficiency is barred by the plain language of S

57-1-32, Otah Code,
position, Valley

Despite lack of authority to support its

states

that the

enforcement of a guarantee.
Valley's

statute does not apply to

Br. pp. 13-15.

nonresponsiveness

to

Sine's

arguments

is

especially noticeable on the subject of its failure to comply
with this statute.

The following points are included in Sine's

brief (pp. 7-12), but remain unrebutted for the most part:
10. The judgment is invalid for failure to
comply with S 57-1-32.
11. The plain language of § 57-1-32 is broad
and without exception.
12.
It would be unfair and contrary to S
57-1-32 to allow a deficiency judgment under these
circumstances.
Valley fails to directly refute these points, but

seems

to ask the Court to look past the plain language of the statute.
§ 57-1-32 provides as follows:
At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinafter
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security, and in such action the
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed,
the amount for which such property was sold, and
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale.
Before rendering the judgment, the court shall find
the fair market value at the date of sale of the
property sold. The court may not render judgment
for more than the amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness with interest, costs and expenses of
sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of
the date of the sale. . . .
- 4 -

§ 57-1-32, Utah Code (1986) (emphasis altered from original).
The highlighted portions are those which were not complied with
by Valley and the lower court.

The complaint was brought too

soon, it lacked the required allegations and the court did not
make the required findings.
"[T3he plain language of the statute [is that] . . . if
the

beneficiary

of

a

trust

deed

elects

to foreclose non-

judicially, is owed a deficiency following application of the
sale proceeds, and wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment," the
statutory

procedure

must

deficiency is waived."

be

followed

"or any

claim to a

G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Durbano,

121 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1989).

Valley waived

its deficiency, since more than three months have passed since
the sale and a proper deficiency action has not been brought.
The statute does not in any way limit its effect to a
deficiency lawsuit against the principal debtor.

It applies to

"any sale of property under a trust deed" as provided in the
statutes

on

trust

deed

foreclosure.

§ 57-1-32, Utah Code

(1986).

Valley's nonjudicial sheriff sale must have been by

authority of those provisions, or it was without any authority
at all.
If such a sale occurs, a deficiency is allowed only as
provided in § 57-1-32, Utah Code.
comply with that statute.

Valley is not required to

It must comply, though, if it chooses

to foreclose independently and deny the debtors the protection
- 5 -

of

the

courts.

procedure

for

" [Slection
securing

a

57-1-32 provides

deficiency

judgment

the

exclusive

following

trustee's sale of the real property under a trust deed."

a

Cox v.

Green, 696 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Utah 1985).
The

statute

does

debtors and guarantors.

not

differentiate

between

principal

Valley reads the difference into it,

despite the clear wording.

Valley's observation that Sine was

not the maker of the note or the giver of security is of no
significance under the wording of the statute.
Statutory terms are used advisedly, and should be given
an interpretation and application which is in accord with their
usually accepted meaning.

Board of Educ. of Granite School

Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983).
wording

controls

the

interpretation.

Cox

Rock

Literal

Products v.

Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672 Utah App. 1988; Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, Cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah App. 1988).

"Plain meaning" will not be

ignored in favor of some effort to divine legislative intent.
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 245, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah
1988).

4.
treatment

Valley dodged the point on this issue.
of

§

Strevell-Paterson
1982).

57-1-32

depends

entirely

on

the

Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d

But that case is not on point.
- 6 -

Its short
case
741

of

(Utah

It merely makes the

obvious point that an unconditional guarantee of payment allows
the creditor to proceed against the guarantor without exhausting
its remedies against the principal.

646 P.2d at 743-744.

But

this is not the issue.
The issue is whether, having elected to exhaust its self
help remedies within the trust deed statute, Valley can ignore
the applicable limitations and sue for a deficiency.

Since a

deficiency is only possible within the statute, the issue must
be resolved in the negative.

This issue is not treated even

remotely by Strevell-Paterson.
But that case does provide a helpful analogy, citing to
FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979),
cited by Strevell-Paterson, 646 P.2d at 743.

FMA construed §

70A-9-504(3), the Uniform Commercial Code provision requiring
creditors to give notice to the "debtor" in order to accomplish
a

commercially

reasonable

nonjudicial

sale of

collateral.

"Debtor" was held to include a mere guarantor, and no deficiency
was possible unless the guarantor was given reasonable notice of
the sale.

590 P.2d at 807.

Like the trust deed statute at

issue here, the UCC provision litigated in FMA does not even
mention guarantors.

But they are included nevertheless.

The purpose of the notice requirement is for the
protection of the debtor [which includes the
guarantor], by permitting him to bid at the sale,
or arrange for interested parties to bid, and to
otherwise assure that the sale is conducted in a
commercially
reasonable manner.
The danger
resulting from not notifying the debtor of the sale
of secured property is that the property may be
- 7 -

sold for an amount unreasonably below its market
value, burdening the debtor with liability for the
deficiency.
FMA, 590 P.2d at 807 (bracketed portion added).
meaning"

statutory

policy—avoiding

construction

an absolute

applies.

bidding

The same "plain
The

same

public

power by the creditor,

which would in turn produce an arbitrary deficiency judgment—
applies to both statutes.

In FMA the guarantor was not properly

notified of the sale, so no judgment against him was possible.

5.

The affidavits establish an agreement for Valley to

bid the full debt.
Br. p. 15-16.

Valley's point III contends to the contrary.

But it really amounts to an argument for a trial

to determine whether an agreement was formed.

And as indicated

above, Valley has admitted in connection with this promise that
it "agreed to do certain things."
According

Br. p. 7.

to Sine's affidavit, Valley's

representative

stated: "I need not worry that Valley Bank would bid on the
property at the amount owed on the note plus interest, costs and
attorney fees."
continues,

Opening Br., Appendix IV 11 3, R. 057.

"I was

asked

if

I planned

to attend

He

the sale.

Relying upon this assurance from Mr. Doctorman and Mr. Zollinger
I told them I probably would not and did not. . . . "

Id 11 4, R.

058.
Mr. Cundick's affidavit states, "in response to concerns
raised

by

Mr. Sine, Mr. Doctorman
- 8 -

represented

that

at the

sheriff's sale . . . Valley Bank would bid on the property at
the amount owed, plus interest/ plus attorney fees."

Id. at K

5, R. 059.
Valley

merely

argues

semantics

when

assurance something other than an "agreement."
this

issuef

if

determine.
include

would

be

for

the

calls

the

A question on
fact

finder

to

A conflict as to the terms the parties intended to

in an

jury.

relevant,

it

agreement

presents

Hays v. Underwood/

a factual

question

for

the

411 P.2d 717/ 720-721/ 196 Kan. 265

(1966).
Valley's suggestion that this Court should view Valley's
statement "in context"

(Br. p. 16) is another invitation for a

trial to determine the proper context.
court/

and

should

not

have

asked

Valley may not ask this

the trial

court

on

summary

judgment/ to weigh the facts.
Valley also asks this Court to delve into whether there
was

an

offer/

acceptance

and

consideration.

Br. pp. 16-17.

This is still another factual inquiry that should have been made
at trial.

The affidavits indicate Valley offered to Sine that

Valley would bid in the whole debt

(thereby extinguishing it).

Sine both stated his acceptance/ and refrained from attendance
or efforts to find bidders.
Valley
consideration/

argues
despite

that
the

there
holding

is
of

a

lack
the

of

trial

is

proper

court

that

"there is consideration for the oral agreement in the form of
- 9 -

defendant's purported failure to attend or encourage others to
attend the trustee's sale. . . . "

Summary Decision, Opening Br.

Appendix II, Response Br. Addendum A, p. 3, R. 090.

The effort

to make a controversy on this issue shows that a trial is needed
to examine consideration and/or the lower court decision was
ambiguous.

Again, Valley failed to preserve its disagreement

with the finding of consideration by cross-appealing.
So consideration for the promise lies in the detriment to
Valley of losing a deficiency
detriment to Sine in

right on the one hand, and a

absenting himself from a sale he had the

right to attend on the other.

In response, Valley asserts that

Sine could not have bid or found a bidder.

Evidence in support

of such an argument was not presented by affidavit and no trial
was had to receive it.

6.
frauds.

The agreement
Valley

also

fails

arguments on this issue.
Response Br. pp. 19-20.

is not covered by the statute of
to

properly

respond

to

Sine's

Compare Opening Br. pp. 2, 7 with

Sine incorporates his arguments on this

point by reference, as it is inappropriate to rehash them in a
reply brief.

Points 2, 3 and 9.

Once again, for this point Valley relies exclusively on
Strevell-Paterson
1982).

Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d

That case does not apply here either.

741

It states that a

release of a guarantee is covered by the statute of frauds.
P.2d at 742.
_ l n _

(Utah

646

But here the unconditional open-ended guarantee was not
released.

It is true that the agreement to bid in the full debt

extinguished the guaranteed debtf making judgment in this case
impossible.

But it does not change the nature of the guarantee.

If Valley were to lend additional funds to Sine's parents, his
guarantee would likely still be in effect.
that the guarantee itself was released.

No one has argued

Valley has emphasized

repeatedly that it is continuing in nature.

But obviously Sine

would be Valley's debtor only to the extent there remains a debt
owing which may be guaranteed.
Of course even if this agreement were otherwise covered
by the statute of frauds, part performance, waiver and estoppel
take it outside the statute.

7.

Part performance may be considered.

One of the first

arguments Valley makes is that the lower court made an error—
that it was right to hold for Valley but may have done so on an
incorrect basis.

Br. p. 11.

Valley urges that this Court may

affirm the decision on a ground raised for the first time on
appeal.

Id.

Yet later Valley asserts that the doctrine of part

performance was not raised by Sine below and so may not be
considered on appeal. Br. p. 20-22.
This is an unusual case for Valley to complain that part
performance was not raised in answer to its complaint for the
following reasons, among others:
a.

The action was filed December 13, and a return of
- 11 -

service was filed December 29, 1989.
day

Sine's

occurred.

performance

(not

R. 006.

attending

This is the same

the

sheriff

sale)

Is it surprising part performance was not set forth

in the answer as specifically as Valley would like?
b.
issue, making

The complaint did not allege a statute of frauds
it impossible to raise part performance as a

defense in the answer.
c.

The answer does raise "settlement" and "accord

and satisfaction" in its Third Defense.

R. 009.

This is

sufficient notice pleading to raise the fact the parties agreed
to extinguish the debt.
Valley argues (Br. p. 24) that part performance may not
be discussed here; that Valley's action is "at law" and part
performance is "purely equitable in nature."

Yet it is Valley

who relies upon the statute of frauds to escape a promise it
must have later regretted.

Is Valley asserting that the statute

of frauds can be raised

in this case, but avoidance of it

cannot?

The statute of frauds itself states: "Nothing in this

chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case
of part performance thereof." § 25-5-8, Utah Code.
The

part

performance

exception

is

well

Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981).

recognized.
In Baldwin

v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984), both parties had
admitted the existence of the oral contract, as they do in this
- 12 -

appeal.

Some partial payments for the real estate involved.

"This part performance was sufficient to remove the contract
from the statute of frauds under these circumstances where the
existence of the contract was admitted."

8.

676 P.2d at 417.

Part performance was timely raised.

that Sine did not claim
Valley's summary judgment

Valley states

part performance in his response to
motion.

Actually, the agreement to

bid in the full debt was described.

Defendant's Response to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 11 3, R. 052. "In
reliance

upon

that

agreement

defendant

did

not

attend

the

trustee!']s sale, did not bid at that sale tor] make efforts to
have others bid at that sale."
affidavits, attached
performance,

then,

Id.

See also Sine and Cundick

to the Response.
was

performance occurred.

fully

R. 057-060.

described

shortly

Sine's

after

the

Apparently Valley quibbles with failure

to identify the doctrine by name.

Not only is this unnecessary,

but it would be absurd to expect it, since the statute of frauds
defense was not even raised by Valley until later.
The statute of frauds first became part of this case
until Valley's reply memorandum.

So Sine had no pleading in

which to restate its part performance theory before summary
judgment was issued.

It was, however, specifically argued in

Sine's Objection to Order, Motion for a New Trial or to Correct
Decision and Memorandum of Authorities.
- 13 -

R. 92-94.

This motion

was
The

filed within the ten days permitted by Rule 59(b), URCP.
motion

permitted

was
for

based
error

in
in

part

on

law).

Rule

Even

59(a)(7)

the

portion

(new

trial

of

Sine's

document which objected to the order attacked its substance, not
its form.

So the five day limitation of Rule 4-504(2), Code of

Judicial Administration does not apply.
The

important

performance

in

his

fact

is

first

that

Sine

memorandum

described
and

the

part

affidavit,

then

specifically labeled it as such in his next pleading: the motion
for a new trial or to reconsider.
opportunity
facts.

The

to

consider

court

had

the
much

The trial court had ample

doctrine's
more

applicability

notice

and

to

opportunity

the
to

consider the facts and theory of part performance than was true
in Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d
1040,

1045

preserve

(Utah 1983).

it for appeal

A matter

is sufficiently

if it has been submitted

raised

to

to the trial

court, which has had an opportunity to consider it and rule upon
it.

See, James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987).
Defendants also contend that the plaintiffs raise
in their brief in this court for the first time
matters which were not presented to the district
court, and hence should not be considered here.
The principle is correct. But its application here
is not. Upon examination we find that, though the
pleadings and submissions speak in generality, the
critical matters recited above pertaining to the
plaintiffs' claim of fraud were sufficiently set
forth in the pleadings, affidavits and depositions.

- 14 -

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Utah 1976).

9.

Promissory estoppel was timely raised.

Valley's

argument to the contrary (point 8 above) misses the mark for the
same reasons as its argument that part performance was not
timely raised.

Sine's arguments in response to that argument

are incorporated herein.
Valley admits estoppel was raised in Sine's answer, as
its Second Defense.

R. 009.

In paragraph 3 of Defendant's

Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Sine sets
forth Valley's assurance about bidding at the trustee's sale,
and that Sine stayed away and refrained from seeking bidders
n

[i]n reliance upon that agreement."

R. 052.

The affidavits

attached gave more detail on the promise and reliance.
The Supplemental Affidavit of Wesley Sine (filed a month
before the decision was rendered in this case) stated in part:
As indicated in his prior affidavit herein. Affiant
change[d]
his
position
in
a material
and
substantial way by not attending the trustee's sale
and not attempting to obtain higher bidders at that
sale in reliance upon plaintiff's assurances that
plaintiff would be the full amount owed to
plaintiff and that there would be no claim of a
deficiency.
Affiant believes that plaintiff is
therefor estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds,
lack of consideration, or other defenses to the
enforceability of said oral agreement.
R. 074, 11 2.

A copy of the Supplemental Affidavit is attached

hereto as Appendix I.

- 15 -

The Summary Decision of the court even

acknowledges that

one of the grounds for Sine!s opposition to summary judgment was
that
and

"plaintiff

orally waived

is thus estopped

a claim for deficiency

from proceeding

judgment

against defendant."

R.

088, Appendix II, Opening Brief, Addendum A, Valley's Response
Brief.

The court went on to override the

invalidate

the agreement

under

estoppel theory and

the statute of frauds, without

explaining why estoppel did not apply.
Finally, estoppel was argued again in the post judgment
motion discussed above.
a

straight

face

that

promissory estoppel"?
Valley

argues

R. 093, 11 3.
Sine

"failed

How can Valley argue with
to

raise

the

defense

of

Br. p. 26-27.
that

promissory

estoppel

cannot

prevail

because it is not convinced the promise to bid the full debt in
fact

caused

Sine's

reliance, and

have bid or found a bidder.

is not convinced

Br. pp. 28-29.

Sine could

These are merely

factual doubts, and are not arguments in support of dismissal on
summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Valley is stuck with the plain meaning of the statute on
deficiency judgments.

Having made no effort to comply when it

arbitrarily credit bid about

$840,000, Valley will have to be

satisfied with ownership of the motel.
- 16 -

Valley
deficiency

agreed

judgment/

or

represented

lulling

Sine

its bid
into

would

vitiate a

complacency.

The

agreement was to wipe out the debt, not release the guarantee
itself.
did.

So the statute of frauds does not apply.

Valley

cannot

avoid

its

promise

with

Even if it

impunity,

since

estoppel, waiver and part performance take it out of the statute
of frauds.

The decision should be reversed and/or remanded for

trial.
Respectfully so requested March 19, 1990.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 19, 1990 I caused to be
hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, the original and
seven copies of the foregoing to the office of the Clerk of the
Utah Court of Appeals, and that I caused four true and correct
copies of the foregoing to also be served by postage prepaid
mail or hand delivery to the following at the address indicated:
Gary Doctorman, Esq.
50 West Broadway
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

Mitchell R. Barker
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Ronald C. Barker #0208
Attorney for defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9636
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
ooOoo
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
WESLEY SINE

vs.
WESLEY SINE,

Case No. C88-0907962CV
Defendant*

Judge Michael Murphy
ooOoo

A F F I D A V I T

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.

County of Salt Lake)
WESLEY SINE, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and
says that he is the defendant in the above entitled action;

that

he has personal knowledge concerning each of the following statements and is competent to testify with respect thereto except as
otherwise noted:
1.

That Jerry Sine

Investments

is a general partnership

whose partners are Jerry Sine and Dora Sine.

Said partnership

has existed for many years and has regularly filed partnership
tax returns with the State of Utah and with the Internal Revenue
Service. Plaintiff and its counsel are well aware of that partnership since the same counsel for plaintiff herein also appeared as
- 1 -

counsel for Valley Bank & Trust Company in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding involving said partnership.
2.

As indicated

in his prior

affidavit

herein, Affiant

changes his position in a material and substantial way by not
attending the trustee's sale and not attempting to obtain higher
bidders at that sale in reliance upon plaintiff's assurances that
plaintiff would bid the full amount owed to plaintiff and that
there would be no claim of a deficiency.

Affiant believes that

plaintiff is therefore estopped to assert Statute of Frauds, lack
of consideration, or other defenses to the enforceability of said
oral agreement.
Dated the 22*^

day of February, 19^9.
Wesley P. Sine

Subscribed and sworn to before me the^g?

7

day o f T e b r u a r y , 1989.

notary Public Residing at
S a l t Lake C i t y , TJtah
My commission e x pires:j^4
i r e s : (Xuay^ut j^/9?/

«

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, postage prepaid, the j & Z ^ day of February, 1989, to each
of the following persons at the addresses indicated:
Gary Doctorman, Esq. and Elizabeth S. Whitney, Esq., BIELE,
HASLAM & HATCH, 50 West Broadway
#400, salt
Salt Lake
Lake city,
City, utc
Utah
3way-v*4UU,
84101.
Ronald C. Barker
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